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Abstract
The B method has facilitated the development of software by specifying the design of software as abstract
machines and formally verifying the correctness of the abstract machines. The quality of B abstract machines
can significantly impact the quality of final software products. In this paper, we propose a set of criteria for
measuring the quality of B abstract machines based on ISO/IEC 25010, which is one of the latest international
standards for evaluating software quality in software engineering. These criteria evaluate abstract machines
using a number of general-purpose and domain-independent equations and model checking techniques, so that
the quality of abstract machines can be quantified as vectors. The proposed criteria are implemented as a B
model quality evaluator, and they are explained and justified using a number of examples.
1 Introduction
Model checking techniques enable developers to formally verify whether design models of software products satisfy
desired properties in their state transition systems [1]. Given a design model with a number of initial states,
operations and desired properties, model checkers such as ProB [2] and NuSMV [3] can compute a state transition
system by iteratively deriving new states from existing states using the operations, and counterexamples violating
the desired properties can be reported. However, the counterexamples only indicate single flaws in the state
transition system, but may not reflect the overall quality of the design model. If a model checker can measure
the overall quality of design models, designers can decide whether and how to further improve the models before
actually implementing software products.
Much work has been done on measuring the quality of design models from different aspects. For example, in [4],
the semantic quality is used to evaluate the correctness (validity) and completeness of models with respect to real
world domains. If a model does not include any representations that contradict with knowledge in a real world
domain, then the model is semantically correct. If the model includes all necessary knowledge in the real world
domain, then the model is semantically correct. Moreover, in the B-method [5], the consistency of a model can be
evaluated by verifying whether a model satisfies given specifications. Additionally, simple measurements such as
the size of statements and the lines of code have been used to evaluate the quality of code [6]. The above studies
have provided different criteria of model quality on specific tasks, but have not provided unified measurements of
model quality.
The above problem motivates us to develop a set of criteria for measuring the model quality based on ISO/IEC
25010 [7], which is a unified international standard for systematically measuring the quality of software products.
We develop our criteria based on the B-method [5], and they can be extended to other formal model design methods
with state transition systems. The contributions of our work include:
• criteria for measuring functional suitability of formal design models with respect to given functional
requirements
• criteria for measuring security and reliability of formal design models with respect to given invariants
• criteria for measuring maintainability, performance efficiency and usability of formal design models using
model checking techniques
• the application of the above criteria to the B-method
• an evaluation for the above criteria on the Volvo cruise controller model.
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The rest of this paper includes five sections. Section 2 introduces preliminary knowledge such as ISO/IEC 25010
and the B-method. Section 3 introduces the proposed criteria for measuring the quality of formal design models and
provides examples to explain the criteria. Section 4 uses the Volvo cruise controller model to evaluate the proposed
criteria. Section 5 compares the proposed criteria with other existing criteria. Section 6 concludes our work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce preliminary knowledge of our work, including ISO/IEC 25010, which is one of the
international standards of software quality, and model checking techniques for computing state transition systems.
2.1 ISO/IEC 25010
ISO/IEC 25010 [7] is one of the latest international standards for systematically measuring the quality of software
products. Its latest version was reviewed and confirmed in 2017. The ancestor of ISO/IEC 25010 is ISO/IEC 9126,
which has been used to evaluate a wide range of software products in past decades [8]. ISO/IEC 25010 includes the
following eight characteristics to measure the quality of software products.
• Functional suitability concerns whether a software product meets functional requirements.
• Performance efficiency concerns whether a software product can effectively make use of given resources.
• Compatibility concerns whether a software product can consistently perform its functions while exchanging
information and sharing resources with other products.
• Usability concerns whether users can effectively and efficiently use a software product to complete tasks.
• Reliability concerns whether a software product can perform desired functions after scheduled to work.
• Security concerns whether a software product can protect its data and only allows authorised users to access
the data.
• Maintainability concerns whether a software product can be easily modified, repaired and updated by
maintainers.
• Portability concerns whether a software product can be easily used in different environments.
The eight characteristics can derive different criteria for different applications. For example, in mobile computing,
reliability and security have higher weights than other characteristics [9], and their criteria need to be specifically
designed for mobile environments.
2.2 Model Checking
Model checking techniques [1] can derive state transition systems from design models. A design model usually
has an initialisation statement that derives one or more initial states and a number of operations that derive
state transitions from the initial states. Each operation has a pre-condition describing when the operation can
be activated and a post-condition describing the consequence of activating the operation. Model checkers can
instantiate the activation of operations using state transitions of the form [s, f, t], where f is an operation, p is an
existing state satisfying the pre-condition of f , and t is a new state satisfying the post-condition of f . All available
state transitions form a labelled state transition system of the design model. Moreover, the model checkers can
check if the state transition system satisfies desired properties. For example, ProB [2] can check properties written
in first-order logic, and NuSMV [3] can check properties written in linear temporal logic and computational tree
logic.
In our work, we use design models and state transition systems in the B method [5] as examples to develop
criteria of design model quality. Fig. 1 shows six B design models. In these models, initial states are derived from
INITIALISATION clauses, and operations are specified under OPERATIONS clauses. Pre-conditions of operations
are described using predicates between PRE (or WHERE) and THEN, and post-conditions are described using
substitutions between THEN and END. Desired properties are described using predicates after INVARIANT clauses.
These models will be used in Section 3 to explain our proposed criteria.
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MACHINE CM1 // Clock Model 1
VARIABLES hour, minute
INVARIANT hour : 0..23 & minute : 0..59
INITIALISATION hour := 0; minute := 0
OPERATIONS
inc minute =
PRE minute < 59
THEN minute := minute + 1 END;
inc hour = PRE minute = 59 & hour < 23
THEN minute := 0; hour := hour + 1 END;
next day =
PRE minute = 59 & hour = 23
THEN minute := 0; hour := 0 END END
(a) Clock Model 1 (CM1)
MACHINE CM2 // Clock Model 2
VARIABLES hour, minute
INVARIANT hour : 0..23 & minute : 0..59
INITIALISATION hour := 0; minute := 0
OPERATIONS
inc minute =
PRE minute < 59
THEN minute := minute + 1 END;
inc hour = PRE minute = 59 & hour < 23
THEN minute := 1; hour := hour + 1 END;
next day =
PRE minute = 59 & hour = 23
THEN minute := 0 ; hour := 0 END END
(b) Clock Model 2 (CM2)
MACHINE CM3 // Clock Model 3
VARIABLES hour, minute
INVARIANT hour : 0..23 & minute : 0..59
INITIALISATION hour := 0; minute := 0
OPERATIONS
inc minute = PRE minute < 58
THEN minute := minute + 1 END;
inc minute part 2 = PRE minute = 58
THEN minute := 59 END;
inc hour = PRE minute = 59 & hour < 23
THEN minute := 0; hour := hour + 1 END;
next day = PRE minute = 59 & hour = 23
THEN minute := 0; hour := 0 END
END
(c) Clock Model 3 (CM3)
MACHINE CM4 // Clock Model 4
VARIABLES hour, minute
INVARIANT hour : 0..23 & minute : 0..59
INITIALISATION hour := 0; minute := 0
OPERATIONS
inc minute = PRE minute <= 59
THEN minute := minute + 1
END;
inc hour =
PRE minute = 59 & hour <= 23
THEN minute := 0; hour := hour + 1
END;
next day = PRE minute = 59 & hour = 23
THEN minute := 0; hour := 0 END END
(d) Clock Model 4 (CM4)
MACHINE CM5 // Clock Model 5
VARIABLES hour, minute
INVARIANT hour : 0..23 & minute : 0..59
INITIALISATION hour := 0; minute := 0
OPERATIONS
inc minute = SELECT hour = 3 & minute = 0
THEN hour := 6; minute := 0
WHEN minute < 59
& not(hour = 5 & minute = 29)
THEN minute := minute + 1 END;
inc hour = PRE minute = 59 & hour < 23
THEN minute := 0; hour := hour + 1 END;
next day = PRE minute = 59 & hour = 23
THEN minute := 0; hour := 0 END END
(e) Clock Model 5 (CM5)
MACHINE CM6 // Clock Model 6
VARIABLES hour, minute
INVARIANT hour : 0..23 & minute : 0..59
INITIALISATION hour := 0; minute := 0
OPERATIONS
inc minute = PRE minute < 59
THEN minute := minute + 1 END;
inc hour = PRE minute = 59 & hour < 23
THEN minute := 0; hour := hour + 1 END;
next day = PRE minute = 59 & hour = 23
THEN minute := 0; hour := 0 END;
set time = ANY hh, mm
WHERE hh : 0..23 & mm : 0..59
THEN hour := hh; minute := mm END END
(f) Clock Model 6 (CM6)
Figure 1: Clock models for explaining the criteria of B model quality.
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3 Criteria for Measuring Quality of
Formal Design Models
To evaluate the quality of B models, we derive a number of criteria from ISO/IEC 25010. Among the eight
characteristics of ISO/IEC 25010, six characteristics including functional suitability, reliability, performance
efficiency, usability, security and maintainability can be reflected by B models. The remaining two characteristics,
i.e., compatibility and portability, cannot be reflected by B models because these characteristics are measured after
software is actually implemented, installed on a real machine and used by users. In the following parts, we define
a set of criteria for measuring the quality of B models based on the six characteristics.
Fig. 1 shows examples of clock models to explain the proposed criteria. These models are expected to represent
the change of minutes and hours within a day using two variables “hour” and “minute”. All models have the
same invariant that restricts the domain of the variables. The variable hour must be an integer between 0 and 23,
and the variable minute must be an integer between 0 and 59. The two variables can represent time from 0:00 to
23:59. The initial values of hour and minute are 0, and their values are changed via “inc minute”, “inc hour” and
“next day” operations. The operations in Clock Model 1 (CM1) are all correct. The inc minute operator can count
minute from 0 to 59. When minute = 59, the inc hour operator increases hour by 1 and resets minute to 0, and
the pre-condition hour < 23 ensures that the value of hour does not exceed 23 after running this operation. The
operations in other models may be faulty and slightly different from their counterparts in CM1, and such differences
are underlined in Fig. 1. These differences will be explained later when explaining the proposed criteria.
3.1 Functional Suitability
Functional suitability of B models can be measured by observing whether given B models provide operations
that meet desired functional requirements specified by users. To describe the functional requirements, the users can
directly provide a set of required state transitions Trequired, or provide a set of descriptions that can infer Trequired.
For example, functional requirements for the clock models can be specified using the following state transitions:
• totally 1,416 state transitions of the form [(h, m), inc minute, (h, m+ 1)] (h = 0, . . . , 23 and m = 0, . . . , 58),
which represent the first 59 minutes within an hour, e.g., [(0, 0), inc minute, (0, 1)], [(9, 34), inc minute, (9,
35)] and [(23, 58), inc minute, (23, 59)].
• totally 23 state transitions of the form [(h, 59), inc hour, (h + 1, 0)] (h = 0, . . . , 22), which represent the
last one minute within an hour except the last one minute of a day, e.g., [(0, 59), inc hour, (1, 0)], [(9, 59),
inc hour, (10, 0)] and [(22,59), inc hour, (23, 0)].
• a state transition [(23, 59), next day, (0, 0)], which represents the last one minute of a day.
There are totally 1,440 required state transitions for the clock models. If the clock models can exactly derive the
required state transitions, then their functional suitability is high because they meet the functional requirements.
Generally, suppose that Trequired and a B model M is given, the sub-characteristics of functional suitability, i.e.,
functional completeness, functional correctness and functional appropriateness, can be measured using the following
criteria.
The functional completeness of M can be reflected by observing whether the required state transitions can
be derived by M . Let Tderived denote a set containing all state transitions derived by M , the total functional
completeness (TFComp) of M can be computed via
TFComp = |Tderived ∩ Trequired| / |Trequired| (1)
In this formula, Tderived ∩ Trequired collects derived state transitions that are required by the users. The whole
formula computes the percentage of the derived state transitions with respect to all the required state transitions.
For example, the total functional completeness of CM1 is 1 because CM1 can derive all the required state transitions.
Regarding Clock Model 2 (CM2) in Fig. 1 (b), the underlined substitution “minute := 1” results in 23 unexpected
state transitions of the form [(h, 59), inc hour, (h + 1, 1)] (h = 0, . . . , 22), while 23 required state transitions of
the form [(h, 59), inc hour, (h + 1, 0)] (h = 0, . . . , 22) and other 23 required state transitions of the form [(h, 0),
inc minute, (h, 1)] (h = 1, . . . , 23) are missing. As Tderived ∩ Trequired includes 1, 440 − 23 − 23 = 1, 394 state
transitions, the total functional completeness of CM2 is 1, 394/1, 440 ≈ 0.968.
Although CM2 derives the 23 unexpected state transitions, these transitions can partially reach the functional
requirements. For example, [(1, 59), inc hour, (2, 1)], which is an unexpected state transition, is very similar to the
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required state transition [(1, 59), inc hour, (2, 0)]. In this case, minor corrections to the given B model can make it
fit the functional requirements, so that its functional completeness can be increased. To measure the possibility of
turning unexpected state transitions to required state transitions, partial functional completeness (PFComp)
is introduced:
PFComp =
Similarity(Tderived, Trequired)
Size(Trequired)
(2)
In this formula, Similarity(T1, T2) computes the similarity between two sets of state transitions T1 and T2 by finding
maximum alignments from state transitions in T1 to state transitions in T2. Let [(v1, . . . , vN ), α, (v
′
1, . . . , v
′
N )]
and [(w1, . . . , wN ), β, (w
′
1, . . . , w
′
N )] denote two state transitions, they can be flattened to be two lists
[v1, . . . , vN , α, v
′
1, . . . , v
′
N ] and [w1, . . . , wN , β, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
N ]. The elements in the first lists are compared with their
counterparts in the second list, so that the number of equal elements between the two lists can be counted. For
example, the two state transitions [(1, 59), inc hour, (2, 1)] and [(1, 59), inc hour, (2, 0)] can be flattened to be
[1, 59, inc hour, 2, 1] and [1, 59, inc hour, 2, 0], and the number of equal elements between them is 4. To find
maximum alignments between the two sets of state transitions T1 and T2, the number of equal elements between
each state transition in T1 and each state transition in T2 is counted. When the number of equal elements reaches
a highest value, the corresponding two state transitions are aligned. Note that a state transition in T1 can be
aligned with at most one state transition in T2, and vice versa. After finding all aligned state transitions, the
total number of aligned elements is returned to be the similarity between T1 and T2. For example, as mentioned
before, CM2 has 23 derived state transitions of the form [(h, 59), inc hour, (h + 1, 1)] (h = 0, . . . , 22), which can
be aligned with the 23 required state transitions of the form [(h, 59), inc hour, (h+ 1, 0)] (h = 0, . . . , 22), and the
number of equal elements in each alignment is 4 out of 5. Besides, CM2 has 1,394 derived state transitions that
are exactly the same as the required state transitions. As a result, the value of Similarity(Tderived, Trequired) for
CM2 is 4× 23 + 5× 1, 394 = 7, 062. Size(T ) is the size of a set of state transitions T . It is computed by flattening
all state transitions in T to be lists and counting the total number of elements in the lists. For example, the clock
models require 1,440 state transitions with 5 elements, i.e., two elements in pre-states, an operation identifier and
two elements in post-states, so that the value of Size(Trequired) for the clock models is 5 × 1, 440 = 7, 200. The
partial functional completeness of CM2 is 7, 062/7, 200 ≈ 0.981.
The functional correctness of M can be measured by observing whether all the state transitions in Tderived
are precisely derived. To measure the precision of Tderived, total functional correctness (TFCorr) of M is
computed via
TFCorr = |Tderived ∩ Trequired| / |Tderived| (3)
This formula computes the percentage of correctly derived state transitions with respect to all the derived state
transitions. Recall the example of CM2, Tderived ∩ Trequired has 1,394 state transitions, and Tderived has 1, 394+23 =
1, 417 state transitions. As a result, the total functional correctness of CM2 is 1, 394/1, 417 ≈ 0.984. Regarding
CM1, its total functional correctness is 1 because CM1 derives all the required state transitions and does not derive
any unnecessary state transitions.
As discussed before, CM2 derives the 23 incorrect state transitions of the form [(h, 59), inc hour, (h + 1, 1)]
(h = 0, . . . , 22). Minor corrections that change these state transitions to [(h, 59), inc hour, (h+1, 0)] (h = 0, . . . , 22)
can make CM2 precisely fit the functional requirements, so that the functional correctness can be increased to 1.
To measure the possibility of turning incorrect state transitions to be correct, partial functional correctness
(PFCorr) is introduced:
PFCorr =
Similarity(Tderived, Trequired)
Size(Tderived)
(4)
For example, Similarity(Tderived, Trequired) for CM2 is 7, 062, and Size(Tderived) for CM2 is 5× 1, 417 = 7, 085, so
that the partial functional correctness is 7, 062/7, 085 ≈ 0.997.
As both the functional correctness and the functional completeness of CM2 are lower than 1, CM2 is considered
incomplete and inconsistent with respect to the functional requirements. It is possible that a B model is complete
and inconsistent, or incomplete and consistent. If Trequired ( Tderived, then the model is complete and inconsistent
because the model derives not only all required state transitions, but also a number of unexpected state transitions. If
Tderived ( Trequired, then the model is incomplete and consistent because the model does not derive any unexpected
state transitions, but a set of required state transitions are missing.
The functional appropriateness of M can be measured by observing whether all required pairs of pre- and
post-states (abbreviated as “pairs” in later discussions) are achievable regardless of operations. Let Pderived be a
set containing all pairs of the form (s, t) such that (s, α, t) ∈ Tderived, and let Prequired be a set containing all pairs
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of the form (s, t) such that (s, α, t) ∈ Trequired, total functional appropriateness (TFAppr) of M is computed
via
TFAppr = |Pderived ∩ Prequired| / |Prequired| (5)
In this formula, Pderived ∩ Prequired collects derived pairs that are required by the users. The whole formula
computes the percentage of the collected pairs with respect to all the required pairs. Intuitively, if a required state
transition is not achievable using the required operation, but is achievable using an alternative operation, then
the alternative operation is appropriate with respect to the functional requirements. For example, in Fig. 1 (c),
Clock Model 3 (CM3) has two operations inc minute and inc minute part 2 that derive state transitions of the
form [(h, m), inc minute, (h, m + 1)] (h = 0, . . . , 23 and m = 0, . . . , 57) and [(h, 58), inc minute part 2, (h, 59)]
(h = 0, . . . , 23). The above state transitions lead to pairs of the form [(h, m), (h, m + 1)] (h = 0, . . . , 23 and
m = 0, . . . , 58), and these pairs are appropriate with respect to the required state transitions of inc minute, which
are of the form [(h, m), inc minute, (h, m+ 1)] (h = 0, . . . , 23 and m = 0, . . . , 58). This means that the functional
requirements of inc minute are achievable by integrating inc minute and inc minute part 2 in CM3. As a result, the
total functional appropriateness of CM3 is 1. Regarding CM2, its Pderived contains 23 pairs of the form [(h, 59), (h,
1)] (h = 0, . . . , 22) that are inappropriate with respect to the required [(h, 59), (h, 0)] (h = 0, . . . , 22). Moreover,
CM2 fails to derive 23 required state transitions of the form [(h, 0), inc minute, (h, 1)] (h = 1, . . . , 23), so that 23
pairs of the form [(h, 0), (h, 1)] (h = 1, . . . , 23) are missing. As the number of required pairs are 1,440, the number of
appropriate pairs is 1, 440− 23− 23 = 1, 394. The total functional appropriateness of CM2 is 1, 394/1, 440 ≈ 0.968.
It is possible that minor changes can turn inappropriate pairs to be appropriate. For example, in CM2, [(2,
59), inc hour, (3, 1)] is inappropriate, but replacing 1 with 0 can make it be an appropriate state transition [(2,
59), inc hour, (3, 0)]. To measure the possibility that minor changes can turn inappropriate state transitions to be
appropriate, partial functional appropriateness (PFAppr) is introduced:
PFAppr =
Similarity(Pderived, Prequired)
Size(Prequired)
(6)
For example, CM2 has 23 inappropriate pairs of the form [(h, 59), (h, 1)] (h = 0, . . . , 22) that can become appropriate
by replacing 1 with 0, and the other 1,394 pairs are all appropriate. As the number of variables in each pair is
4, the value of Similarity(Pderived, Prequired) is 4 × 1, 394 + (4 − 1) × 23 = 5, 645. The value of Size(Prequired) is
4× 1, 440 = 5, 760. As a result, the partial functional appropriateness is 5, 645/5, 760 ≈ 0.980.
3.2 Security and Reliability
In B models, properties of security and reliability are usually specified using invariants. As assertions in B
models are a special type of invariants, in the following discussions, “invariants” include assertions, and “invariant
violations” include assertion violations. In our work, deadlock-freeness, which requires that each state has at least
one outgoing transition, is considered as an inherent invariant and is always checked even if it is not specified in
the B models.
Sub-characteristics of security include confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, accountability and authenticity,
and sub-characteristics of reliability include maturity, availability, fault tolerance and recoverability. Among
these sub-characteristics, properties of confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and maturity can be specified using
invariants. Confidentiality requires that any unauthorised accounts do not access protected data. To ensure the
confidentiality, an invariant can be specified to check that all derived state transitions do not lead to any states
where an unauthorised account is reading a protected file. Integrity requires that any unauthorised accounts do
not access and modify protected data. To ensure the integrity, an additional restriction can be add into the invariant
of confidentiality to check that the unauthorised account is not writing to the protected file. Authenticity requires
that an accessed identity is the corresponding claimed identity. To ensure the authenticity, an invariant can be
specified to check if the claimed identity and the accessed identity remain the same at any time after accessing
the identity and before releasing the identity. Maturity requires that a model performs required functions under
normal operations and can be measured by observing: (1) whether the model meets the functional requirements,
which can be measured using the criteria of the functional completeness and the functional consistency, and (2)
whether operations in the model can normally run without violating any invariants, which can be measured together
with confidentiality, integrity and authenticity using invariant satisfability:
Invariant Satisfability = |T>derived| / |Tderived| (7)
where T>derived is a set containing all derived state transitions that do not trigger any invariant violations. This
formula computes the percentage of correctly derived state transitions with respect to all derived state transitions.
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For example, in Fig. 1 (d), Clock Model 4 (CM4) violates its invariants because inc minutes can be activated
at the end of the 59th minute, resulting in 24 faulty state transitions of the form [(h, 59), inc minute, (h, 60)]
(h = 0, . . . , 23) that violate the invariant “minute : 0..59”. Moreover, inc hour can be activated at the end of 23:59,
resulting in a faulty state transition [(23, 59), inc hour, (24, 0)]. Besides, CM4 can derive the 1,440 correct state
transitions in Trequired. As a result, T
>
derived contains 1,440 state transitions, Tderived contains 1, 440+24+1 = 1, 465
state transitions, and the invariant satisfability of CM4 is 1, 440/1, 465 ≈ 0.983.
Availability and non-repudiation can be measured by observing whether operations are accessible without
invariant violations. Let Frequired denote a set containing all required operations, which derives the state transitions
in Trequired, and let F
>
derived denote a set containing all accessible and operations without any invariant violations,
which derives the state transitions in T>derived, the following formula is used to compute availability and non-
repudiation:
Availability = |F>derived ∩ Frequired| / |Frequired| (8)
This formula computes the percentage of the correctly accessed operations with respect to the required operations.
For example, CM4 triggers invariant violations because inc minutes and inc hour derive faulty state transitions.
As Frequired contains three operations, i.e., inc minutes, inc hour and next day, and only next day does not trigger
any invariant violations, the availability of CM4 is 1/3 ≈ 0.333.
Accountability can be measured by observing whether the derived states are uniquely traceable. The
significance of uniquely traceable states is that if such a state triggers an invariant violation, the cause of the
invariant violation can be found by tracing back from this state to an initial state. A state s is uniquely traceable
if there exists at most one state transition [spre, α, s] ∈ Tderived such that spre is an initial state, or a uniquely
traceable state. Suppose that S1traceable is a set containing all states that are in Sderived and with at most one
ingoing state transition in Tderived, the accountability is:
Accountability = |S1traceable| / |Sderived| (9)
This formula computes the percentage of states with at most one ingoing transition with respect to all the derived
states. For example, as CM1 only derives the 1,440 states representing each minute from 0:00 to 23:59, each state
can only be traced back to exactly one state representing the previous one minute. As a result, the accountability of
CM1 is 1. On the other hand, If a model derives four state transitions such as [(0, 0), inc x,(1, 0)], [(0, 0), inc y,(0,
1)], [(0, 1), inc x,(1, 1)] and [(1, 0), inc y,(1, 1)], then (1, 1) can be traced back to (0, 1) and (1, 0). As a result,
S1traceable contains three states (0, 0), (0, 1) and (1, 0), and Sderived contains four states (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0) and (1,
1), so that the accountability is 3/4.
Fault tolerance can be measured by observing whether operations in the model M perform their intended
functions when faults occur. Before observation, two types of imitated faults are randomly injected into M . The
first type of faults is a set Textra of extra state transitions that are inserted into M . The second type of faults is
a set Tmissing of missing state transitions that are removed from M . The state transitions in Textra and Tmissing
are randomly generated. After applying the changes to M , the resulting model Mchanged is checked using the ProB
model checker to obtain a set of state transitions Tchanged. To observe the impact of the changes to the other
state transitions, the changes themselves should be masked before observation, so that a set of state transitions
Uchanged = (Tchanged∪Tmissing)−Textra is produced. After producing Uchanged, it is checked against the invariants
to obtain a set U>changed containing all state transitions that satisfy the invariants and a set U
⊥
changed containing all
state transitions that violate the invariants. Based on the above results, we can measure the impact of the imitated
faults via:
Fault Tolerance = 1− |U⊥changed| / |Uchanged| (10)
For example, inserting [(3, 0), inc minute, (12, 0)] to and removing [(5, 29), inc minute, (5, 30)] from CM1 lead
to Clock Model 5 (CM5) in Fig. 1 (e). If Mchanged is CM5, Tchanged will include state transitions representing
each minute from 0:00 to 5:29 and from 12:00 to 23:59 and include [(3, 0), inc minute, (12, 0)]. In this case,
Uchanged includes 1,050 state transitions representing each minute from 0:00 to 5:30 and from 12:00 to 23:59, which
means that the two changes result in a gap between 5:30 and 12:00. This gap makes the state (5, 30) have no
outgoing transitions in Uchanged, so that U
⊥
changed only contains [(5, 29), inc minute, (5, 30)], and U
>
changed contains
the remaining 1,049 state transitions. As a result, the fault tolerance is 1− 1/1, 050 ≈ 0.999. It is very important
to note that we only apply the two changes to the model to simplify the explanation. When actually evaluating M ,
Mchanged is produced by applying a sufficient number of changes to M .
Moreover, the fault tolerance requires M to perform its intended functions when faults occur, which means that
M is expected to re-establish correct state transitions as far as possible. The possibility of re-establishment can be
measured together with recoverability via:
Recoverability = |U>changed ∩ Tderived| / |Tderived| (11)
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This formula computes the percentage of re-establishable state transitions with respect to intended state transitions.
For example, in CM5, the removal of [(5, 29), inc minute, (5, 30)] blocks the derivation of the intended state
transitions from (5, 30), and the insertion of [(3, 0), inc minute, (12, 0)] enables the re-establishment of the intended
state transitions from (12, 0). In this case, U>changed ∩ Tderived contains all the 1,049 state transitions in U>changed,
so that the recoverability is 1, 049/1, 440 ≈ 0.728. An effective way to improve the recoverability is to define a new
operation set time that allows the users to set the time to any points from 0:00 to 23:59. Clock Model 6 (CM6) in
Fig. 1 (f) shows the code of set time, which increases the recoverability to 1.
3.3 Maintainability
Maintainability measures the possibility of modifying the given B model M . Analysability and modifiability,
which are sub-characteristics of maintainability, are computed based on Mchanged because they are observed after
changing M . The analysability measures whether changes to M can significantly impact its functionality and the
satisfiability to the invariants. Intuitively, a maintainer who is not developers of a given model may consider the
model as a black-box. If a slight change to the model can significantly change the behaviour of the model, it will be
relatively easy for the maintainer to decide whether to and how to modify the component. For example, removing
[(5, 29), inc minute, (5, 30)] from CM1 blocks the derivation of the state transitions after (5, 30), which makes
the model miss a significantly number of state transitions. Consequently, the maintainer may infer that inc minute
plays a crucial role in M , so that the modification of existing state transitions with inc minute should be avoided.
To quantify the analysability, we suggest functional analysability and fault analysability.
Functional analysability measures whether changes to M can significantly impact its functionality and is
computed via:
Functional Analysability = 1− |Tderived ∩ Uchanged||Tderived ∪ Uchanged| (12)
In this function, if the functionality of M is significantly impacted by the changes, Uchanged will be significantly
different from Tderived. In this case, the functional analysability is high because their common part Tderived∩Uchanged
only has a few elements. On the other hand, if the changes does not cause significant differences between Uchanged
and Tderived, the functional analysability will be low. For example, after changing CM1 to CM5, Tderived∩Uchanged
contains the 1, 050 state transitions in Uchanged, and Tderived ∪ Uchanged contains the 1, 440 state transitions in
Tderived, so that the functional analysability is 1 − 1, 050/1, 440 ≈ 0.271. Again, please note that we only apply
two changes to CM1 to simplify the explanation. A considerable number of changes should be applied to M when
actually evaluating the analysability of M .
Fault analysability measures whether changes to M can significantly impact its satisfiability to the invariants:
Fault Analysability = 1− |T
⊥
derived ∩ U⊥changed|
|T⊥derived ∪ U⊥changed|
(13)
In this function, if the changes to M can newly introduce a significantly number of invariant violations or eliminate
a significantly number of invariant violations, U⊥changed will be significantly different from T
⊥
derived. As T
⊥
derived ∩
U⊥changed only has a few elements, the fault analysability is high. On the other hand, if the changes does not cause
significant differences on the satisfiability to the invariants, the fault analysability will be low. For example, after
changing CM1 to CM5, T⊥derived is empty, and U
⊥
changed contains only one state transition [(5, 29), inc minute, (5,
30)] because (5, 30) has no outgoing transitions in Uchanged. As T
⊥
derived ∩U⊥changed is empty, the fault analysability
is 1.
Modifiability measures whether M can be modified without introducing invariant violations and significantly
influencing its existing quality. As modifiability can be measured by reusing criteria for other (sub-)characteristics
such as analysability, recoverability, modularity and learnability, we do not define new criteria for modifiability.
Modularity measures whether M has discrete operations such that a change to an operation α has minimal
impact on the other operations. To observe the impact of α on the other operations, a model M∆(α) is produced by
randomly inserting new state transitions with α into or removing existing state transitions with α from M . Next,
state transitions of M∆(α) are derived using the ProB model checker, and all derived state transitions not derived
by α are collected into a set T¬α∆(α). After that, all state transitions derived by M and not derived by α are collected
into a set T¬αderived. The modularity of α is computed via:
Modularity(α) =
|T¬αderived ∩ T¬α∆(α)|
|T¬αderived ∪ T¬α∆(α)|
(14)
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Intuitively, if α is an individual module that has minimum impact on other operations, the changes to α will have
minimum impact on state transitions not derived by α. Consequently, the difference between T¬α∆(α) and T
¬α
derived is
minimum, so that Modularity(α) will be high. On the other hand, if the impact is significant, Modularity(α) will
be low because T¬α∆(α) are significantly different from T
¬α
derived. CM5 can be an example of M∆(α) with respect to
inc minute in CM1. In this example, T¬αderived contains 24 elements, i.e., the 23 state transitions derived by inc hour
and the only one state transition derived by next day, while T¬α∆(α) contains all the state transitions in T
¬α
derived except
[(5, 59), inc hour, (6, 0)]. As a result, the modularity is (24 − 1)/24 ≈ 0.958. It is important to note that we only
apply two changes to CM1 to produce CM5 to simply the explanation. When actually evaluating the modularity of
α, a sufficient number of changes should be applied to M to produce M∆(α). After obtaining the modularity values
of all operations, the weighted sum of these modularity values is considered as the modularity of the whole model.
The weight of α is the proportion of state transitions with α with respect to all the derived state transitions.
Reusability of M is measured by observing whether each operation can be used in different situations:
Reusability = 1− |Fderived| / |Tderived| (15)
where Fderived is a set containing all operations in the derived state transitions. For example, as CM1 has 3
operations and derives 1,440 operations, the reusability of CM1 is 1 − 3/1, 440 = 0.998. Besides, testability is
measured by observing model checking CPU time within a given time limit, which is introduced in Section 3.4.
3.4 Performance Efficiency and Usability
In this section, we propose criteria for the remaining two characteristics, i.e., performance efficiency and usability.
Performance efficiency of the B model M can be measured by observing the usage of time and hardware resources
during model checking. Sub-characteristics of performance efficiency includes time behaviour, resource utilisation
and capacity. The time behaviour can be measured by observing model checking CPU time TCPUMC . The
resource utilisation can be measured by observing peak memory usage. The capacity is calculated via
Capacity = |Sderived|+ |Tderived| (16)
where Sderived is a set containing all derived states. For example, as CM1 can display time from 0:00 to 23:59,
Sderived has totally 1,440 states. Moreover, Tderived has totally 1,440 state transitions. Thus, the capacity of CM1
is 2, 880.
Useability is measured by observing whether M can efficiently and effectively achieve desired goals. Except
appropriateness recognizability, user error protection and learnability, the other sub-characteristics of useability
need to be measured based on actual software products, but not based on B models. Therefore, we will only
provide criteria of appropriateness recognizability, user error protection and learnability. Appropriateness
recognisability can be measured by (1) functional appropriateness, which has been described before, and (2)
goal appropriateness (GAppr):
GAppr = |G>| / |G| (17)
where G is a set of goal predicates, and G> is a set containing all goal predicates that can be achieved by M . For
example, if two goals for CM1 are “G1: hour + minute < 10” and “G2: hour > 26 & minute < 10”, then G1 is
achievable, while G2 is not. As a result, the goal appropriateness of CM1 is 0.5. Learnability can be measured
by counting the number of words in the source code of M . M includes specifications that may be used to produce
instructions of final software products. If M itself is easy to be understood, the instructions will be more learnable.
The learnability is computed via
Learnability = 1−Min(Nwords, N limitwords) / N limitwords (18)
where Nwords is the number of words in M , and N
limit
words is a word limit given by the users. Besides, User error
protection concerns whether M has mechanisms to avoid the users’ faults and can be measured using the criteria
of security and reliability.
4 Evaluation
The proposed criteria were implemented as a B model quality evaluator with the ProB model checker [2]. To
test the evaluator, we conducted an experiment on a server equipped with two Intel Xeon Gold 6130 Processor,
256GB DDR4 RAM and the Ubuntu Server 18.04 operating system. The proposed criteria were used to compute
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the quality of the Volvo cruise controller (VCC) model, which was downloaded from the ProB Public Example
Repository. Based on the original VCC model (VCC0), we produced an adaptation (VCC1) by (1) inserting new
state transitions, (2) modifying existing state transitions, and (3) deleting existing state transitions. Moreover,
state transitions of VCC0 were extracted to be the required state transitions, and a set of goals were randomly
generated.1 All the proposed criteria were used to measure the quality of VCC0 and VCC1.
Table 1: The Quality of Volvo Cruise Controller Models
Model
Quality Measurement
TFComp PFComp TFCorr PFCorr
VCC0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
VCC1 0.913 0.997 0.770 0.842
TFAppr PFAppr Inv. Sat. Availability
VCC0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
VCC1 0.887 0.996 0.800 0.846
Accountability Fau. Tol. Recoverability Fun. Ana.
VCC0 0.000 0.352 0.089 0.878
VCC1 0.328 0.234 0.065 0.836
Fau. Ana. Modularity Reusability CPU Time
VCC0 0.900 0.913 0.983 6.228 (s)
VCC1 0.841 0.746 0.986 7.982 (s)
Peak Mem. Capacity GAppr Learnability
VCC0 0.166 (GB) 27,052 1.000 0.982
VCC1 0.168 (GB) 32,500 0.890 0.982
Table 1 shows the divergence of quality between VCC0 and VCC1. Comparing to VCC0, VCC1 had lower
TFComp, PFComp, TFAppr and PFAppr because a number of required state transitions were missing. A side-
effect of the missing state transitions was the reduction of fault tolerance, recoverability and modularity because
a number of paths for VCC1 to perform expected functions and recover from unexpected states were missing.
Another side-effect was the reduction of GAppr because a number of paths to the goals were blocked. Moreover,
VCC1 had lower TFCorr and PFCorr because it had a set of unexpected state transitions. Besides, these transitions
might violate the invariants, reducing the invariant satisfiability and availability. Additionally, VCC1 had higher
accountability, CPU time and capacity because it had a set of new state transitions and traceable states. The above
results revealed that the proposed criteria could reflect the divergence of model quality from different aspects.
5 Related Work
The proposed criteria are similar to a number of existing criteria of design model quality. In [4], the semantic
quality is used to measure whether a design model can precisely reflect knowledge in real world domains. As both
the semantic quality and the functional suitability in ISO/IEC 25010 [7] are defined for correctness and completeness,
the proposed TFComp, PFComp, TFCorr and PFCorr can be used to quantify the semantic quality. In [6], the size
of statements and the lines of code have been used to measure the readability of code, which can be supplemented
using Eq. (18) for learnability. In automatic model construction, model quality can be measured using fitness
functions that reflect the distance between state transition systems and observations in the real world [10]. The
fitness functions are similar to PFComp and PFCorr because they concern whether a model can fit functional
requirements.
In [11], a wide range of criteria for measuring the quality of design models have been reviewed and classified into
six categories: correctness, completeness, consistency, comprehensibility, confinement and changeability, which are
named “6C goals”. In the 6C goals, correctness and completeness have similar definitions with their counterparts
in ISO/IEC 25010 [7], so that they can be measured using the proposed TFComp, PFComp, TFCorr and PFCorr.
Consistency requires that a model does not contradicts with desired properties, and it can be measured using Eq.
(7) for invariant satisfability and Eq. (17) for goal appropriateness. Comprehensibility requires that a model is
1The dataset is available on https://github.com/cchrewrite/VCC-data.
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analysable to human users or tools, which can be measured using Eq. (12) for functional analysability and Eq. (13)
for fault analysability. Confinement requires that a model should be precise and abstract. The precision of a model
can be measured using TFCorr and PFCorr, but whether the model is abstract cannot be reflected by the proposed
criteria. Changeability requires that a model can be easily improved by developers, which can be measured using
the equations for maintainability in Section 3.3. Because of the above reasons, the proposed criteria can describe
most aspects of the 6C goals.
6 Conclusion
Based on ISO/IEC 25010, we have proposed a set of criteria for evaluating design model quality. These criteria
can be used together with model checking techniques to quantify the quality of state transition systems of design
models. Moreover, the criteria have been implemented as a B model evaluator, and the experimental results on the
Volvo cruise controller models have revealed that the evaluator can show the divergence of model quality between
two different models.
In the future, we will use syntactic analysis methods to evaluate design models at the language level. Moreover,
we will extend the proposed criteria to temporal logics. Additionally, the criteria will be extended to the field of
automatic model repair.
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